Partially ordered cooperative games: Extended core and Shapley value
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Publication:926365
DOI10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9zbMath1138.91329OpenAlexW1998702299WikidataQ58217265 ScholiaQ58217265MaRDI QIDQ926365
Francisco Ramón Fernández García, Justo Puerto, Yolanda Hinojosa
Publication date: 27 May 2008
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9
Related Items (10)
Interval-valued cores and interval-valued dominance cores of cooperative games endowed with interval-valued payoffs ⋮ Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ Pareto-optimal security strategies in matrix games with fuzzy payoffs ⋮ Cooperative interval games: a survey ⋮ Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games ⋮ A preemptive goal programming for multi‐objective cooperative games: an application to multi‐objective linear production ⋮ Cooperative games under interval uncertainty: on the convexity of the interval undominated cores ⋮ A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games ⋮ A further discussion on fuzzy interval cooperative games
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