A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management

DOI10.1007/s10479-007-0240-yzbMath1203.90019OpenAlexW2084958141MaRDI QIDQ926368

Manuel A. Mosquera, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

Publication date: 27 May 2008

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11093/1176

zbMATH Keywords

centralized multi-agent inventory cost situationscoalitional manipulationinventory gamesSOC-rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Related Items (5)

The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ Cost allocation in inventory transportation systems ⋮ \(p\)-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts ⋮ Cooperative game theory and inventory management ⋮ Altruistic profit allocation rules for joint replenishment with carbon cap-and-trade policy

Cites Work

• The newsvendor game has a nonempty core
• Economic lot-sizing games
• Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games
• Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
• Cooperation and competition in inventory games
• Inventory games.
• Cores of inventory centralization games
• The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims.
• Cost allocation in continuous-review inventory models

This page was built for publication: A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management