A dynamic Cournot-Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game

DOI10.1007/s10287-006-0031-yzbMath1134.91338OpenAlexW2060716573MaRDI QIDQ926556

Talat S. Genc

Publication date: 20 May 2008

Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-006-0031-y

zbMATH Keywords

communicationdemand uncertaintycomplete/incomplete informationproduction-investment dynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)

Related Items (1)

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production

Cites Work

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• Distributed algorithms for the computation of noncooperative equilibria
• Relaxation techniques and asynchronous algorithms for on-line computation of non-cooperative equilibria
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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