Minimal large sets for cooperative games
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Publication:926580
DOI10.1007/s11750-007-0016-1zbMath1134.91320OpenAlexW1983391290MaRDI QIDQ926580
Carles Rafels, F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz
Publication date: 20 May 2008
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0016-1
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