Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.011zbMath1134.91539OpenAlexW2082407499MaRDI QIDQ926788

Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://toyama.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=1341

zbMATH Keywords

balancednessstrategy-proofnessaugmented revelation mechanismquasi-strong-non-bossinessthe revelation principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (11)

Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ Information disclosure with many alternatives

Cites Work

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• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• A crash course in implementation theory
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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