The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.009zbMath1134.91307OpenAlexW3123927120MaRDI QIDQ926789

Elsie Sterbin Gottlieb

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.009

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentscontestscommitmentrent-seekingcostly leader gamesnoisy leader games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models ⋮ Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking ⋮ Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games ⋮ Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types ⋮ Pre-contest communication incentives ⋮ Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader

Cites Work

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