The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
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Publication:926789
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.009zbMath1134.91307OpenAlexW3123927120MaRDI QIDQ926789
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.009
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Cites Work
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- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
