Proper scoring rules for general decision models
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Publication:926877
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.002zbMath1134.91365OpenAlexW2040451044MaRDI QIDQ926877
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/75926/
implementationsubjective expected utilityChoquet expected utilityscoring rulemultiple priorsprobability elicitationexperimental procedures
Related Items (4)
Eliciting second-order beliefs ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ Proper scoring rules with general preferences: a dual characterization of optimal reports ⋮ Eliciting ambiguous beliefs using constructed ambiguous acts: alpha-maxmin
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