Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
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Publication:926882
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.08.004zbMath1134.91306OpenAlexW1974940338MaRDI QIDQ926882
David L. Dickinson, Marie Claire Villeval
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.004
Related Items (7)
FRAMING OF INCENTIVES AND EFFORT PROVISION ⋮ When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation ⋮ Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods ⋮ The timing of discretionary bonuses -- effort, signals, and reciprocity ⋮ Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority ⋮ Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance ⋮ Incentives and group identity
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