A non-cooperative interpretation of the \(f\)-just rules of bankruptcy problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.10.005zbMath1134.91311OpenAlexW1972206367MaRDI QIDQ926886

Chih Chang, Cheng-Cheng Hu

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

converse consistencybankruptcy problembilateral consistency\(f\)-just rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (12)

A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws ⋮ Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective ⋮ A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game ⋮ A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds ⋮ GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

Cites Work

• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Stability and the Nash solution
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• The converse consistency principle in bargaining.
• Divide-and-permute
• Reduced game and converse consistency
• Multilateral Bargaining

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