Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.006zbMath1134.91388OpenAlexW3121295896MaRDI QIDQ926888

Per Baltzer Overgaard, René Kirkegaard

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric biddersfirst-price and second-price auctionspre-auction offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction

Cites Work

• Auctions with a buy price
• Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
• The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• The impact of discounting on an auction with a buyout option: a theoretical analysis motivated by eBay's buy-it-now feature
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
• Buy-price English auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
• Buy prices in online auctions: Irrationality on the internet?

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