Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008zbMath1134.91329OpenAlexW2145150393MaRDI QIDQ926890

Eliot Maenner

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

complexitylearningrepeated gamesbounded rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Rational belief hierarchies ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games

Cites Work

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