Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees
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Publication:926895
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003zbMath1134.91349OpenAlexW2075245675MaRDI QIDQ926895
Ernan E. Haruvy, Dale O. II Stahl
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.003
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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