Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
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Publication:926898
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.003zbMath1134.91360OpenAlexW1971263970MaRDI QIDQ926898
Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.003
Related Items (23)
Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities ⋮ Consensus reaching in committees ⋮ A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability ⋮ The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization ⋮ A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution ⋮ Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games ⋮ Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games ⋮ Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ On the Nucleolus as a Power Index ⋮ Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Legislative Bargaining ⋮ Influence functions, followers and command games ⋮ On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria ⋮ On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application ⋮ Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models ⋮ Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
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