Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.08.007zbMath1134.91327OpenAlexW1977351923WikidataQ124846015 ScholiaQ124846015MaRDI QIDQ926900

Philipp C. Wichardt

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.08.007

zbMATH Keywords

existenceNash equilibriumimperfect recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (9)

Characterizations of perfect recall ⋮ Rethinking formal models of partially observable multiagent decision making ⋮ Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight ⋮ A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting ⋮ Reasoning about causality in games ⋮ Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property ⋮ On equilibria in games with imperfect recall ⋮ Extensive games with possibly unaware players ⋮ Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties

Cites Work

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• On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
• Game with Repeated Decisions
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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