The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0256-xzbMath1135.91344OpenAlexW2106385192MaRDI QIDQ927412

Ines Lindner

Publication date: 6 June 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0256-x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

Measuring influence in command games ⋮ The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games

Cites Work

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• Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
• Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• Values of Large Games, I: A Limit Theorem
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables

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