Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
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Publication:927417
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0264-xzbMath1135.91330OpenAlexW2133862670MaRDI QIDQ927417
Matthias Dahm, Nicolás Porteiro
Publication date: 6 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1409.pdf
Related Items (7)
Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation ⋮ To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question ⋮ Legislative informational lobbying ⋮ A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Dynamic expert incentives in teams ⋮ Uncertain product risk, information acquisition, and product liability
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