A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0265-9zbMath1135.91400OpenAlexW1968012436MaRDI QIDQ927419

Byungchae Rhee

Publication date: 6 June 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.10860.1079681544.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

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