A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8zbMath1135.91314OpenAlexW2051606440MaRDI QIDQ927420

Claus-Jochen Haake, Dinko Dimitrov

Publication date: 6 June 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315655

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members ⋮ Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Government versus opposition: who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?

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