Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model

DOI10.1007/S00712-007-0307-XzbMath1135.91306OpenAlexW2037884686MaRDI QIDQ927431

Miguel Aramendia

Publication date: 6 June 2008

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0307-x

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesCournot oligopoly model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (1)

Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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