Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
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Publication:928023
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2007.07.006zbMath1161.91330OpenAlexW2042969573WikidataQ126211160 ScholiaQ126211160MaRDI QIDQ928023
Publication date: 11 June 2008
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2007.07.006
Related Items (8)
Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin ⋮ A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements ⋮ On the Nucleolus as a Power Index ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Random marginal and random removal values ⋮ Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games ⋮ Subgame-perfection in free transition games
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