Truth as an epistemic ideal

DOI10.1007/S10992-007-9068-9zbMath1144.03006OpenAlexW1981964087MaRDI QIDQ928710

John Nolt

Publication date: 11 June 2008

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9068-9

zbMATH Keywords

truthKripke semanticswarrantC. S. PeirceCrispin Wrightinquirysuperassertability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (1)

Investigating Knowledge and Opinion

Cites Work

• Reference and perspective in intuitionistic logics
• On the strong semantical completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus
• Modal Logics Between S 4 and S 5
• Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi

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