Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances

DOI10.1007/s10992-007-9069-8zbMath1142.03320OpenAlexW2075301686MaRDI QIDQ928712

Scott Soames

Publication date: 11 June 2008

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-007-9069-8

zbMATH Keywords

semantic contents of sentences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

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