Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?
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Publication:928877
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.08.001zbMath1136.91398OpenAlexW3123702890MaRDI QIDQ928877
Georg Nöldeke, George J. Mailath
Publication date: 11 June 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/07-022.pdf
Related Items (3)
Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications ⋮ Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers ⋮ Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
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