Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
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Publication:928879
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.002zbMath1136.91498OpenAlexW2019313657MaRDI QIDQ928879
Grigory Kosenok, Sergei Severinov
Publication date: 11 June 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.002
individual rationalitymechanism designBayesian implementationex-post budget balancingsurplus allocation
Related Items (11)
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ An efficient solution to the informed principal problem ⋮ Incentive compatible market design with applications ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization
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