Bankruptcy and firm finance

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0267-YzbMath1149.91038OpenAlexW2146790671MaRDI QIDQ929351

Tridib Sharma, Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date: 17 June 2008

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0267-y

zbMATH Keywords

InflationBankruptcyDebtDefaultContractsCreditor protectionEnforcementLegal environmentLimited commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (12)

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation ⋮ Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts ⋮ Credit and self-employment ⋮ Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment ⋮ A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization ⋮ Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks ⋮ Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts ⋮ The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis ⋮ Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement ⋮ Debt contracts and cooperative improvements ⋮ Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification ⋮ Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy

Cites Work

• Is dynamic general equilibrium a theory of everything?
• Sources of TFP growth: occupational choice and financial deepening
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Informational asymmetries in macroeconomics and finance: An introduction
• Capital accumulation and real exchange rate behavior in a small open economy with credit market frictions
• Incentive compatible contractible information
• Domestic financial market frictions, unrestricted international capital flows, and crises in small open economies
• A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
• Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
• Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default

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