A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
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Publication:930005
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.09.003zbMath1154.91392OpenAlexW2091175508MaRDI QIDQ930005
Publication date: 19 June 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.09.003
Cites Work
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- Continuous-valued social choice
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Voting and group decision functions
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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