Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.10.003zbMath1153.91361OpenAlexW2052158340MaRDI QIDQ930006

Frédéric Koessler

Publication date: 19 June 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2006-12.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkcertifiable informationcommunication to multiple audiencesconsistency of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma ⋮ The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences

Cites Work

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• Long persuasion games
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages

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