How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6zbMath1142.91433OpenAlexW2127882486MaRDI QIDQ930481

Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 30 June 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (16)

On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity ⋮ Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences ⋮ Approval-based apportionment ⋮ Coincidence of Condorcet committees ⋮ Balancing the power to appoint officers ⋮ Robustness among multiwinner voting rules ⋮ On the rule of \(k\) names ⋮ Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? ⋮ Electing a committee with dominance constraints

Cites Work

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• Self-selection consistent functions
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• On the rule of \(k\) names
• The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions

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