How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
From MaRDI portal
Publication:930481
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6zbMath1142.91433OpenAlexW2127882486MaRDI QIDQ930481
Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0268-6
Related Items (16)
On stable rules for selecting committees ⋮ Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity ⋮ Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences ⋮ Approval-based apportionment ⋮ Coincidence of Condorcet committees ⋮ Balancing the power to appoint officers ⋮ Robustness among multiwinner voting rules ⋮ On the rule of \(k\) names ⋮ Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences ⋮ Utilitarian welfare and representation guarantees of approval-based multiwinner rules ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? ⋮ Electing a committee with dominance constraints
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Self-selection consistent functions
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- A dictionary for voting paradoxes
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
- Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Voting by Committees
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
This page was built for publication: How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
