Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
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Publication:930485
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0270-zzbMath1142.91416OpenAlexW2088844807MaRDI QIDQ930485
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0270-z
Related Items
Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
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