Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems
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Publication:930486
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0272-xzbMath1142.91694OpenAlexW2050536663MaRDI QIDQ930486
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0272-x
Related Items (7)
Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Decentralized job matching ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
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- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
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- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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