Self-selective social choice functions

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0276-6zbMath1142.91438OpenAlexW2125459372WikidataQ61586292 ScholiaQ61586292MaRDI QIDQ930487

Semih Koray, Arkadii M. Slinko

Publication date: 30 June 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23111

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains, Self-selective social choice functions, On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules, Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents, Hyper-stable social welfare functions, Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray

Cites Work

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• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions