Self-selective social choice functions
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Publication:930487
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0276-6zbMath1142.91438OpenAlexW2125459372WikidataQ61586292 ScholiaQ61586292MaRDI QIDQ930487
Semih Koray, Arkadii M. Slinko
Publication date: 30 June 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23111
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