A special case of Penrose's limit theorem when abstention is allowed

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9076-9zbMath1153.91363OpenAlexW2018284689MaRDI QIDQ931429

Ines Lindner

Publication date: 25 June 2008

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9076-9

zbMATH Keywords

limit theoremsweighted voting gamesvoting powerternary voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

Criticality in games with multiple levels of approval

Cites Work

• Ternary voting games
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• The voter who wasn't there: referenda, representation and abstention
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
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