Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals
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Publication:931784
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.004zbMath1141.91328OpenAlexW2269158136MaRDI QIDQ931784
Jérôme Renault, Sergio Scarlatti, Marco Scarsini
Publication date: 26 June 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3132/1/mindiscount20071212.pdf
repeated gamesdiscount factorimperfect monitoringPareto-efficiencyprivate equilibriapublic equilibria
Related Items (4)
Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Perfect information games where each player acts only once ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring
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