Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001zbMath1141.91350OpenAlexW2075838120MaRDI QIDQ931785

Gwenaël Piaser, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Nicolás Porteiro, Andrea Attar

Publication date: 26 June 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Related Items (4)

On take it or leave it offers in common agency ⋮ The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections ⋮ Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games ⋮ On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

Cites Work

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• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
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