Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
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Publication:931785
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001zbMath1141.91350OpenAlexW2075838120MaRDI QIDQ931785
Gwenaël Piaser, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Nicolás Porteiro, Andrea Attar
Publication date: 26 June 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001
Related Items (4)
On take it or leave it offers in common agency ⋮ The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections ⋮ Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games ⋮ On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
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