The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.013zbMath1142.91646OpenAlexW2096808761MaRDI QIDQ932763

Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/967333/guid-2277ef84-ca5b-4d93-bfbb-de1aba0d0c74-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessindivisible goodssecond-best incentive compatibilitycoordinate-wise core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ Centralized allocation in multiple markets ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods

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