On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.12.001zbMath1142.91491OpenAlexW2077652138MaRDI QIDQ932774

Ilia Tsetlin, Claudio Mezzetti

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269781/files/twerp_832.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctions\((k+1)\) st price auction\(k\) th price auctionhighest-losing bidlowest-winning bid

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions

Cites Work

• Uses of exchangeability
• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
• Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
• Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

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