Efficient communication in the electronic mail game

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.12.003zbMath1142.91304OpenAlexW2161631751MaRDI QIDQ932805

Kris De Jaegher

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/31474

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityequilibrium refinementsgroundingelectronic mail gameefficient communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests

Cites Work

• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Operating systems. An advanced course
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Control System Dynamics
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Coordinated action in the electronic mail game

This page was built for publication: Efficient communication in the electronic mail game