Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.002zbMath1142.90407OpenAlexW2084800967MaRDI QIDQ932808

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

splittingproportional ruleprobabilistic schedulingmerging

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35)

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Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Compensation and sacrifice in the probabilistic rationing of indivisible units ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay ⋮ Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism ⋮ New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation ⋮ Knapsack cost sharing ⋮ Progressive and merging-proof taxation

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