New complexity results about Nash equilibria
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Publication:932810
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.015zbMath1142.91365OpenAlexW2013815105MaRDI QIDQ932810
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas W. Sandholm
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.981.7572
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