A polynomial-time algorithm for a stable matching problem with linear valuations and bounded side payments

DOI10.1007/BF03167514zbMath1142.91692MaRDI QIDQ933267

Rashid Farooq

Publication date: 21 July 2008

Published in: Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamestable marriage model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries

Cites Work

• Convexity and Steinitz's exchange property
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Discrete convex analysis
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
• A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Discrete Convex Analysis
• A Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Side Payments: An Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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