Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment-dominance relations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:933749
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0104-3zbMath1149.91020OpenAlexW2037942578MaRDI QIDQ933749
Publication date: 25 July 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0104-3
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements
- An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
- A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- How to share the cost of a public good
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game
- The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the \(\alpha\)-core
- A note on NTU convexity
- Punishment strategies make the \(\alpha\)-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced
- The consistency principle for games in strategic form
- Cores of convex games
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game Theory
- Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
- Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games
- The Approximation of Fixed Points of a Continuous Mapping
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
