Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0111-4zbMath1147.91003OpenAlexW2043664267MaRDI QIDQ933753

Milan Horniaček

Publication date: 25 July 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0111-4

zbMATH Keywords

PreferencesAgreementsNegotiationThe core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (4)

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Costless delay in negotiations ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ Solving coalitional resource games

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• Order independent equilibria
• A market to implement the core
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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