On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0113-2zbMath1151.91045OpenAlexW3091660735MaRDI QIDQ933757

Rudy C. Douven, Jacob Christiaan Engwerda

Publication date: 25 July 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0113-2

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionDiagonally dominant Stieltjes matrix

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Dynamic modelling of monetary and fiscal cooperation among nations
• Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
• The Bargaining Problem
• Schur complements of diagonally dominant matrices
• A Linear Algebra Proof that the Inverse of a Strictly Ultrametric Matrix is a Strictly Diagonally Dominant Stieltjes Matrix
• A class of inverse M-matrices

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