Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games

DOI10.1007/s11229-007-9275-5zbMath1140.91315OpenAlexW2095650413MaRDI QIDQ934775

Boudewijn de Bruin

Publication date: 30 July 2008

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9275-5

zbMATH Keywords

RationalityCommon knowledgeEpistemic characterisation theoremPayoff uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction
• The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.
• Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
• Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
• Dynamic interactive epistemology
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• ERRATUM: "RATIONAL DYNAMICS AND EPISTEMIC LOGIC IN GAMES"
• A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games
• Admissibility in Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Probability logic for type spaces

This page was built for publication: Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games