A new psychologism in logic? Reflections from the point of view of belief revision
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Publication:934826
DOI10.1007/s11225-008-9099-4zbMath1149.03300OpenAlexW2010231700MaRDI QIDQ934826
Publication date: 30 July 2008
Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-008-9099-4
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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Cites Work
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