Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models
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Publication:934897
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0274-zzbMath1147.91020OpenAlexW2050802123MaRDI QIDQ934897
Publication date: 30 July 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0274-z
EquilibriumMonitoringCostly state verificationDirect lendingFinancial intermediationMulti-lender coalition
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Financial intermediary-coalitions
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
- The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
- A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
- Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
- Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- An Algorithm for the Computation of Linear Forms
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