Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

DOI10.1007/s10660-008-9013-1zbMath1144.91317OpenAlexW2070050027MaRDI QIDQ934962

Michael H. Rothkopf, Heejin Park, Phillip G. Bradford, Sunju Park

Publication date: 31 July 2008

Published in: Electronic Commerce Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-008-9013-1

zbMATH Keywords

bidder incentivescryptographic Vickrey actionsYao's millionaires' protocol

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

Cites Work

• Electronic jury voting protocols
• Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions
• Zero-knowledge proofs of identity
• Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited
• Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
• A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
• The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Financial Cryptography and Data Security
• Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation
• Computer Aided Verification
• Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
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