Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers

DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0046-7zbMath1140.91364OpenAlexW2034889598MaRDI QIDQ934974

Garud Iyengar, Anuj Kumar

Publication date: 31 July 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0046-7

zbMATH Keywords

capacity constraintsmultiple sourcingprocurement auctionsoptimal direct mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Auction and contracting mechanisms for channel coordination with consideration of participants' risk attitudes ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers ⋮ Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders ⋮ Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis ⋮ Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results ⋮ Ex anteandEx postSubcontracting between Two Competing Bidders

Cites Work

• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality.
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening

This page was built for publication: Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers