Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.006zbMath1140.91350OpenAlexW2112679996MaRDI QIDQ936635

Biung-Ghi Ju

Publication date: 19 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyefficiencylocal stabilitylocationdiversityno-envystrong Nash equilibriumcommunity divisionself-selection consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks ⋮ Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules ⋮ Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
• Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
• Locating libraries on a street
• Locating public facilities by majority: stability, consistency and group formation
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods

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