Veto-based delegation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004zbMath1140.91344OpenAlexW2165722851MaRDI QIDQ936643

Tymofiy Mylovanov

Publication date: 19 August 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationimplementationdelegationveto powerprincipal-agent relationshipno monetary transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

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• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations